China\u27s Regulatory Reform: Experiences, Challenges, and Prospects by Hanhua, Zhou
 
CHINA’S REGULATORY REFORM: EXPERIENCES, 
CHALLENGES, AND PROSPECTS 
Zhou Hanhua* 
The installation of a new leadership team by the Eighteenth 
Party Congress in October 2012 was accompanied by significant 
discussion among Chinese intellectuals and in the media about 
restarting the reform agenda that many perceived to have lain 
dormant in the preceding years.  A key part of that agenda, 
sometimes lumped together with economic reform more generally, 
but deserving its own special analysis, is the topic of regulatory 
reform.  The relationship between the government and the market, 
as well as the functions and structure of government agencies, 
require further clarification in order to push forward the overall 
reform agenda.  In this article, I will provide an introduction to 
regulatory reform in China over approximately the past thirty-five to 
forty years.  First, I will briefly introduce some characteristics of the 
earlier Chinese approach to regulation and its disadvantages.  
Second, I will discuss what steps China has taken thus far in pursuit 
of regulatory reform since the opening-up period of the late 1970s 
and early 1980s.  Finally, I will share my observations regarding 
current problems in the area of Chinese regulation, and key 
challenges to further necessary reforms. 
I. THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH 
The approach to regulation in China under the Chinese 
Communist Party (“CCP”) before 1978 was to manage economic 
activity through a very centralized regime. 1   The government 
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 1 See generally Dong Zhikai, Zhongguo Jihua Jingji Shiqi Jihua Guanli de Ruogan 
Wenti ( 中国计划经济时期计划管理的若干问题 ) [Several Issues with Plan 
Administration Under China’s Planned Economy], 5 DANGDAI ZHONGGUOSHI YANJIU 30, 
30–45 (2003) (discussing several problems of the planned economy regime, i.e., the failure 
to promulgate four of the first five five-year plans, the difficulty in efficient decision-
making, the deficiency of implementation, the rigidness in both micro and macro 
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allocated or controlled all resources and activities of individuals as 
well as enterprises.  Under centralized planning, each level of 
government would make its own plan according to the requirements 
of the central government.  Any activities beyond the original plan 
were deemed illegal and incurred punitive consequences. 
In urban areas, there were only two types of enterprises prior 
to 1978: state-owned enterprises and collectively-owned enterprises.  
Most enterprises were controlled by government agencies, and all of 
their activities, including production and sale of goods, were 
planned in advance by the government.2   Each individual was 
affiliated with his or her own work-unit, which provided all of their 
basic needs—including salary, child care, education, health care, 
and housing—though the quality of provided goods and services 
were not always high.3  In rural areas, the land belonged to the 
collective, and every individual farmer had to be a member of the 
People’s Commune (which played a role similar to urban 
enterprises). 4   All products of the People’s Commune were 
purchased by the State for allocation, and farmers or communes had 
no rights to otherwise dispose of any surplus products.5  For quite a 
long time, farmers were treated as “capitalists” even if they traded 
food items for their own personal consumption.6 
This centralized and planned approach to regulation was 
quite successful for the first several years after the inception of the 
PRC as a vehicle for the government to allocate resources and 
stimulate national industrialization.  But this approach was limited 
                                                                                                           
management, the geographical isolation in management, and the over-emphasis on 
infrastructure). 
 2 WU JINGLIAN, DANGDAI ZHONGGUO JINGJI GAIGE JIAOCHENG (当代中国经济改革
教程) [UNDERSTANDING AND INTERPRETING CHINA’S ECONOMIC REFORM] 123–24 (2016). 
 3 Li Ming, Zhengqi Fenkai Shi Jingji Tizhi Gaige de Zhongxin Huanjie (政企分开是
经济体制改革的中心环节) [The Separation Between Government and Enterprises is 
Central to Economic Reform], JINGJI YANJIU 22, 22 (1984).  
 4 See Xin Yi, Jianlun Dagongshe de Fenpei Zhidu (简论大公社的分配制度) [Brief 
Comment on the Big Commune Distribution System], ZHONGGONG DANGSHI YANJIU 22 
(2007) (describing the big commune distribution system as the combination of a wage 
system and a supply system). 
5 GUANYU SHIXING LIANGSHI DE JIHUA SHOUGOU HE JIHUA GONGYING DE MINGLING 
(关于实行粮食的计划收购和计划供应的命令) [DECREE ON THE STATE MONOPOLY FOR 
PURCHASE AND MARKETING OF GRAIN] (promulgated by the State Council, Dec. 23, 1953). 
 6 Bo Yibo, Tonggou Tongxiao de Shixing (统购统销的实行 ) [On the State 
Monopoly for Purchase and Marketing of Grain], 3 ZHONGGONG DANGSHI YANJIU 1, 6–7 
(1991). 
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by fundamental problems: it strangled individual creativity and 
innovation, and produced severe scarcities.7  Consequently, by 1978, 
China had reached the edge of collapse.  To give a few examples, 
annual per capita food consumption in 1976 was 191.5 kilograms, 
which was fewer than the 205.5 kilograms per capita of food 
consumed in 1956.8  The average annual income for farmers in 1976 
was only 62.8 yuan, and there were 250 million people living in 
poverty.9  To combat these and other scarcities, Deng Xiaoping 
initiated a large scale regulatory reform starting in 1978.10 
II. REGULATORY REFORM TO DATE 
A. Separation of Functions 
Regulatory reform in China over the past thirty-five to forty 
years has involved disaggregating various governmental functions 
and granting individuals, enterprises, and the society at large ever 
more space and freedom.  More specifically, the Chinese 
government has promoted four types of separation: (i) separation 
between the government and enterprises, (ii) separation between the 
government and the owners of state assets, (iii) separation between 
the government and public service providers, and (iv) separation 
between the government and society.11 Separation of the ruling 
                                                                                                           
 7 Zhongguo Gongchandang Dishiyijie Zhongyang Weiyuanhui Disanci Quanti Huiyi 
Gongbao (中国共产党第十一届中央委员会第三次全体会议公报) [Communiqué of the 
Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China] (adopted 
on Dec. 22, 1978), 4 SHISHI QIUSHI 5–6. 
8 Chen Donglin (陈东林), Wenhua Dageming Shiqi Guomin Jingji Zhuangkuang 
Yanjiu Shuping (文化大革命”时期国民经济状况研究)[述评) [Review of Research on 
the National Economic Conditions in the Period of “Cultural Revolution”], 2 DANGDAI 
ZHONGGUOSHI YANJIU (当代中国史研究) [CONTEMPORARY CHINA HISTORY STUDIES] 71 
(2008). 
 9 See YANG XIANCAI & ZHANG QIZHI, ZHONGGUO LISHI: ZHONGHUA RENMIN 
GONGHEGUOJUAN (中国历史：中华人民共和国卷) [CHINESE HISTORY: THE PEOPLE’S 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA VOLUME] 323 (2002) (describing poverty in terms of annual income 
and the amount it takes to have a healthy lifestyle). 
 10 EZRA F. VOGEL, DENG XIAOPING AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF CHINA, 423–49 
(2011). 
 11 See HU JINTAO, JIANDING BUYI YANZHE ZHONGGUO TESE SHEHUIZHUYI DAOLU 
QIANJIN, WEI QUANMIAN JIANCHENG XIAOKANG SHEHUI ER FENDOU—ZAI ZHONGGUO 
GONGCHANDANG DISHIBACI QUANGUO DAIBIAO DAHUI SHANG DE BAOGAO (坚定不移沿着
中国特色社会主义道路前进，为全面建成小康社会而奋斗—在中国共产党第十八次
全国代表大会上的报告) [FIRMLY MARCH ON THE PATH OF SOCIALISM WITH CHINESE 
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Party and government agencies has also been discussed, and in 
particular was considered at the Thirteenth Communist Party 
Congress in 1987, though not again to the same extent since then.12 
In order to reduce resistance to these different types of 
reform, the Chinese government adopted an incremental strategy.13  
For example, the household contract responsibility system adopted 
in rural areas in the late 1970s liberated farmers from collective 
communes, but still preserved some aspects of collectivism. 14  
Beginning in the early 1980s, the Chinese government began to 
encourage development of the private sector in urban areas.15  This 
                                                                                                           
CHARACTERISTICS AND STRIVE TO COMPLETE THE BUILDING OF A MODERATELY PROSPEROUS 
SOCIETY IN ALL RESPECTS: REPORT TO THE EIGHTEENTH NATIONAL CONGRESS OF THE 
COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA] (2012) (“To reach the goal of establishing a socialist 
administrative system with Chinese characteristics, we should separate government 
administration from the management of enterprises, state assets, public institutions, and 
social organizations, and build a well-structured, clean and efficient service-oriented 
government that has scientifically defined functions and satisfies the people.”). 
 12 ZHAO ZIYANG, YANZHE YOU ZHONGGUO TESE DE SHEHUI ZHUYI DAOLU QIANJIN: 
ZAI ZHONGGUO GONGCHANDANG DISHISANCI QUANGUO DAIBIAO DAHUI SHANG DE 
BAOGAO (沿着有中国特色的社会主义道路前进: 在中国共产党第十三次全国代表大会
上的报告) [ADVANCE ALONG THE ROAD OF SOCIALISM WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS: 
REPORT TO THE THIRTEENTH NATIONAL CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA] 
(1987). 
 13 See Li, supra note 2, at 47 (discussing the incremental reform strategies adopted in 
China). 
 14 The household responsibility system was a practice introduced in China in 1981 by 
which peasants were given certain production quotas; whatever food they grew beyond the 
quota was sold in the free market at the unregulated prices. See generally Justin Yifu Lin, 
The Household Responsibility System in China’s Agricultural Reform: A Theoretical and 
Empirical Study, 36 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE S199 (1988) (discussing the 
prevalence of the household responsibility system as it relates to changes in rural China). 
The household contract responsibility system didn’t change collective ownership of land. 
See Cai Hua (蔡华), Tudi Quanli, Falü Zhixu he Shehui Bianqian—Jiating Lianchan 
Chengbao Zerenzhi de Falü Shijiao Fenxi (土地权利，法律秩序和社会变迁—家庭联产
承包责任制的法律视角分析) [Land Rights, Legal Order and Social Change: Legal 
Analysis of the Household Contract Responsibility System], 1 ZHAN LUE YU GUAN LI 100, 
102 (2000) (stating that the household contract is actually an agreement regarding common 
services and taxation that is reached by the rural community, peasants and the nation, 
rather than a common civil contract). 
 15 In 1981, the Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China passed 
a resolution that pointed out for the first time that the state economy and the collective 
economy are the basic forms of the Chinese economy. Guanyu Jianguo Yilai Dang de 
Ruogan Lishi Wenti de Jueyi (关于建国以来党的若干历史问题的决议) [Resolution on 
Certain Questions in the History of our Party Since the Founding of the PRC] 
(promulgated by the Sixth Plenary Session of the Eleventh Cent. Comm. of the Communist 
Party of China, effective June 27, 1981). In July of the same year, the State Council issued 
Provisions on Township Non-Agricultural Micro-Economic Policy. Guanyu Chengzhen 
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program included absorption of foreign investment, which helped to 
provide new models for state-owned enterprises and collectively-
owned enterprises, and cleared the way for their eventual 
restructuring in the mid-1990s.16  This later reform included the 
large-scale shutting down of factories and massive layoffs, as well 
as the promulgation of the Company Law in 1993 (which, in 
essence, was intended to cut the link between government and 
enterprise).17  During this process, there were many protests by laid-
off workers, the reverberations of which are still felt today.18 
                                                                                                           
Feinongye Geti Jingji Ruogan Zhengcexing Guiding (关于城镇非农业个体经济若干政策
性规定) [Provisions on Township Non-Agricultural Micro-Economic Policy] (promulgated 
by the State Council, July 7, 1981, effective July 7, 1981). A report to the Twelfth National 
Congress of the Communist Party of China, delivered in September 1982, pointed out that 
“we must also encourage the appropriate development of the individual economy of urban 
and rural working people as a necessary and useful complement to the public economy, 
within limits prescribed by the state and under supervision by industrial and commercial 
administrations.” HU YAOBANG, QUANMIAN KAICHUANG SHEHUIZHUYI XIANDAIHUA 
JIANSHE DE XIN JUMIAN: ZAI ZHONGGUO GONGCHANDANG DISHIERCI QUANGUO DAIBIAO 
DAHUI SHANG DE BAOGAO (全面开创社会主义现代化建设的新局面：在中国共产党第
十二次全国代表大会上的报告) [CREATE A NEW SITUATION IN ALL FIELDS OF SOCIALIST 
MODERNIZATION: REPORT TO THE 12TH CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA] 
(1982). See generally Feng Hui & Wan Qigang, Woguo Geti he Siying Jingji Falü Diwei 
de Lishi Yanbian (我国个体和私营经济法律地位的历史演变 ) [The History and 
Development of the Legal Status of the Individual and Private Economy in China], 11 
DANGDAI ZHONGGUOSHI YANJIU 59, 61–62 (2004) (explaining the historical evolution of 
promoting economies in both rural and urban settings in China). 
 16 See Sang Baichuan, Waishang Touzi de Zhidu Xiaoying yu Waizi Zhanlue 
Tiaozheng (外商投资的制度效应与外资战略调整) [On Institutional Effects of FDI and 
Readjustment of FDI Strategy], 137 KAIFANG DAOBAO 27, 27 (2008) (describing the 
strategies and effects of restructuring). See also HAN CAIZHEN, ZHONGGUO WAIZI ZHENGCE 
HE FALÜ DE JIXIAO FENXI (中国外资政策和法律的绩效分析) [ANALYSIS OF CHINA’S 
FOREIGN INVESTMENT POLICIES AND LAWS] 1– 32 (2007) (discussing the introduction of 
foreign investment and its contribution to China’s opening and reform). 
 17 The commonly-held principle of separation of ownership and control is considered 
to a cure for the ills of traditional state-owned enterprises. According to Article 3 of the 
Company Law, a company is an enterprise with legal person status, has independent 
corporate property, enjoys all corporate property rights, and assumes civil responsibility for 
its debts with all property. Thus, a company shall enjoy all legal personhood and property 
rights (as formed by its shareholders including the state), shall enjoy civil rights, and shall 
bear civil responsibilities pursuant to law. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongsi Fa (中华
人民共和国公司法) [The Company Law of the People’s Republic of China], art. 3 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 1993, effective July 1, 
1994). 
 18 See, e.g., Huang Langhui et al., Guoqi Gaige Wenti Duo—Laizi Diyixian de 
Diaocha Baogao (国企改革问题多—来自第一线的调查报告) [Lots of Problems in 
State-owned Enterprises Reform—A First-line Survey], ZHONGGUO GUOQING GUOLI 30 
(1998) (noting that laid-off workers is one of the biggest problems in state-owned 
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After the transformation of state-owned enterprises (“SOEs”) 
and collectively-owned enterprises, and in accordance with the 
Company Law, SOEs gained the status of independent legal persons 
rather than affiliates of various government agencies.19  In principle, 
SOEs now had to compete with various market players.20  However, 
since various government agencies remained major “shareholders” 
of these SOEs, official priority continued to be placed on the 
accumulation of state assets and protection of SOEs.  Consequently, 
it proved very difficult for government agencies to adequately 
implement the law and treat all market players fairly.21  In order to 
promote a more level playing field and encourage competition, the 
Chinese government established the State-Owned Asset Supervision 
and Administration Commission (“SASAC”) in 2003.22  SASAC is 
a special entity—it is a non-governmental body that embodies the 
                                                                                                           
enterprises reform); Gao Xiaoli & Hu Guiying, Zhuanbian Zhigong Shenfen Gai Gei 
Duoshao Qian (转变职工身份该给多少钱) [How Much to Pay for Transforming the 
Status of Employees], SICHUAN LAODONG BAOZHANG 28 (2004) (discussing the 
determinants of the calculation of compensation for laid-off workers). 
19 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongsi Fa (中华人民共和国公司法) [The Company 
Law of the People’s Republic of China], art. 5 (promulgated by the Fifth Session of the 
Eighth Nat’l People’s Cong., effective July 1st, 1994). 
 20 See Liu Junhai, Woguo Gongsi Fa de Tedian (我国公司法的特点) [The Features 
of the Company Law of China], FAXUE ZAZHI 16, 16–17 (1994) (stating that the 
promulgation of the Company Law of China introduced a new approach to planning the 
economy, under which corporate legislation is based on principles of responsibility and 
corporate governance rather than the ownership of investors; this could remove unfair 
competition between enterprises established by investors with different ownership). 
 21 Jin Chengdong, Minying Jingji de Xingzheng Fa Wenti Ji Qi Gaige (民营经济的行
政法问题及其改革) [Problems and Reform of Administrative Law of the Private Sector], 
36 ZHEJIANG DAXUE XUEBAO (RENWEN SHEHUI KEXUE BAN) 90, 92 (2006). 
 22 The SASAC was founded according to the Decision of the First Session of the 
Tenth National People’s Congress on the Plan for Restructuring the State Council. Dishijie 
Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Diyici Huiyi Guanyu Guowuyuan Jigou Gaige Fangan de 
Jueding (第十届全国人民代表大会第一次会议关于国务院机构改革方案的决定) 
[Decision of the First Session of the Tenth National People’s Congress on the Plan for 
Restructuring the State Council] (promulgated by the First Session of the Tenth Nat’l 
People’s Cong., effective Mar. 10, 2003) ST. COUNCIL GAZ, 9. According to the 
Arrangement on Major Responsibilities, Internal Organizations and Staffing of SASAC 
approved by the State Council, SASAC is the organization authorized by the State Council 
to perform the responsibilities as the investor of the State-owned asset on behalf of the 
central government. Guowuyuan Guoyou Zichan Jiandu Guanli Weiyuanhui Zhuyao Zhize 
Neishe Jigou he Renyuan Bianzhi Guiding (国务院国有资产监督管理委员会主要职责
内设机构和人员编制规定 ) [Arrangement on Major Responsibilities, Internal 
Organizations and Staffing of SASAC Approved by the State Council] (promulgated by 
Gen. Office of the State Council, effective Apr. 25, 2003) ST. COUNCIL GAZ., 21. 
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concept of separation between government and state asset owners.23  
SASAC is responsible for the management of state-owned assets, 
relieving nearly all government agencies from this role.24  With its 
establishment, government agencies were expected to enforce the 
law equally and fairly against SOEs, like all market entities. 
Prior to 1978, the government also monopolized provision of 
public services, either through state-owned and collectively-owned 
enterprises or the People’s Communes (in rural areas), or through 
other public service providers affiliated with government agencies.  
After the initial reform of state-owned and collectively-owned 
enterprises, and the dismantling of the People’s Communes, the 
responsibility of public service provision was left entirely to the 
government itself.25   This overwhelming responsibility made it 
difficult for the government to provide any public service 
effectively. 
To address this “public service provision” problem, the 
Chinese government has since endeavored to separate the roles of 
government and public service providers.  In the early 1990s, 
certain public services, including housing and childcare, were 
pushed entirely onto the private market.26  The responsibility to 
                                                                                                           
 23 Arrangement on Major Responsibilities, supra note 22. 
 24 Articles 4 through 7 of the Interim Regulation on Supervision and Administration 
of the State-Owned Assets of Enterprises make clear the six specific functions of SASAC: 
(1) act as the state-owned assets’ investor in accordance with Corporate Law of People’s 
Republic of China and related administrative regulations; (2) guide and push the reform 
and restructuring of the state-owned enterprises; (3) dispatch the supervisory board to some 
large enterprises on behalf of the state and be in charge of daily management of the 
supervisory board; (4) appoint, remove and evaluate the executives of the enterprises 
through legal procedures and grant rewards and punishments according to their 
performance; (5) supervise the maintenance and appreciation of state assets’ value for 
those state-invested enterprises and reinforce the management of the state-owned assets; 
and (6) perform other duties of state-owned assets’ investor and undertake other issues 
assigned by the government at the same level. Qiye Guoyou Zichan Jiandu Guanli Zanxing 
Tiaoli (企业国有资产监督管理暂行条例) [Interim Regulation on Supervision and 
Administration of the State-owned Assets of Enterprises] (promulgated by No. 378 Order 
of the State Council, May 13, 2003, effective May 27, 2003) ST. COUNCIL GAZ., 5. 
 25 See generally Yu Jianxing, Zhongguo de Gonggong Fuwu Tixi: Fazhan Licheng, 
Shehui Zhengce yu Tizhi Jizhi (中国的公共服务体系：发展历程，社会政策与体制机制) 
[China’s Public Service System: Developments of Social Policy, Institution and 
Mechanism], 43 XUESHU YUEKAN (ACADEMIC MONTHLY) 5, 8 (2011) (explaining how the 
public service provision switched from the control of state- and collectively-owned 
enterprises to the control of the government). 
 26 See, e.g., Zhongguo Jiaoyu Gaige he Fazhan Gangyao (中国教育改革和发展纲要) 
[Outline of China’s Educational Reform and Development] (promulgated by the Cent. 
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provide other public services, such as education and healthcare, was 
to be shared by private providers and the state, which retained some 
basic responsibilities.  Compared to enterprise reform, reforming the 
provision of public services has proven much more difficult, with 
limited progress so far.  This is largely due to the fact that such 
reform is closely connected with the development of various non-
governmental social organizations (“NGOs”), which remain subject 
to rigorous controls (such as the requirement of a government or 
Party sponsor for registration).27  Drawing on the lessons learned 
from mass layoffs in the mid-1990s, reformers have been more 
cautious in their approach to this issue in order to avoid social 
unrest.28 
B. Creating a New Regulatory Framework 
Altogether, through the disaggregation of functions outlined 
above, the Chinese government has unburdened itself of many 
unnecessary tasks and responsibilities.  This gave more power and 
                                                                                                           
Comm. of CPC and the State Council, Feb. 1993) ST. COUNCIL GAZ., 143–60 (stating its 
goal “to change the pattern of government undertaking education single-handedly,” and 
gradually establish a system of running educational institutions mainly by governments 
complemented with social resources); Guowuyuan Guanyu Jixu Jiji Wentuo de Jinxing 
Chengzhen Zhufang Zhidu Gaige de Tongzhi (国务院关于继续积极稳妥地进行城镇住
房制度改革的通知) [Circular of the State Council on Further Promoting the Reform of 
the Urban Housing System Positively and Safely] (promulgated by the State Council, June 
7, 1991) (putting forward ideas to promote reform of the housing system in multiple ways, 
such as by incrementally raising rent, collecting rent deposits, applying new regulations to 
newly constructed houses while applying old regulations to the existing houses, building 
houses with funds collected by buyers, and selling public housing). 
 27 See, e.g., Minban FeiQiye Danwei Dengji Guanli Zanxing Tiaoli (民办非企业单位
登记管理暂行条例) [Interim Regulations on the Registration and Administration of 
Private Non-Enterprise Organizations], art. 8 (promulgated by the State Council, Oct. 25, 
1998), ST. COUNCIL GAZ. (explaining an NGO’s role in public service reform); Shehui 
Tuanti Dengji Guanli Tiaoli (社会团体登记管理条例) [Regulations on the Registration 
and Administration of Social Organizations], art. 9–10 (promulgated by the State Council, 
Oct. 25, 1989), ST. COUNCIL GAZ., 779–80 (explaining the restrictions on NGOs with 
regards to social reform). 
 28 See, e.g., Jiang Handi & Kuang Sheng, Woguo Shiye Danwei Gaige de Nandian yu 
Duice (我国事业单位改革的难点与对策) [Difficulties of Reform of Public Institutions 
and Countermeasures], 10 DANGDAI CAIJING 17, 17 (2005) (arguing that the reform of 
public institutions should take into account the law enforcement, social security back-up 
and restructure of relevant rights and titles); Wang Lanming, Gaige Kaifang Yilai Woguo 
Shiye Danwei Gaige de Lishi Huigu (改革开放以来我国事业单位改革的历史回顾) 
[Review on Public Institutions Reform Since 1978], 6 ZHONGGUO XING ZHENG GUANLI 7 
(2010) (explaining the history of reform of public institutions). 
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autonomy to individuals, enterprises, and civil society. This increase 
in private autonomy is one of the main accomplishments of 
regulatory reform in China thus far and merits recognition.  
However, after the transformation of government functions, 
traditional ways of government regulation have proven to be 
inadequate.  Under the centralized or planned economy, it was quite 
easy for the government, at every level, to manage economic and 
social affairs, because everything was state-owned—from Chinese 
citizens’ homes, to their jobs, to their health care.  But transition 
away from state ownership has created the need for the government 
to establish a new, modern regulatory framework. 
There have been three key dimensions to the regulatory 
reforms that have been undertaken in further response to this need: 
(i) restructuring government agencies, (ii) redefining the 
government’s role, and (iii) establishing new tools for regulation.  
First, regarding the structure of government agencies, government 
ministries used to manage everything in their respective sectors, 
including nominating leaders for state-owned and collectively-
owned enterprises, and determining enterprise inputs and outputs.29  
In 1998, fifteen ministries, and in particular eight “sector 
management” (hangye guanli) ministries—including ministries in 
the areas of electricity, coal, and electronics—were abolished by the 
State Council under the leadership of then premier Zhu Rongji.30  
This institutional restructuring confirmed the emergence of—and 
gave further impetus to—the development of a new kind of 
government agency that was focused on “regulation” (jianguan) 
rather than sector management, and enjoyed more independence 
than the general ministries. 31   Examples of this new kind of 
regulatory agency include the China Securities Regulatory 
                                                                                                           
 29 Luo Gan, Guanyu Guowuyuan Jigou Gaige Fang’An de Shuoming (关于国务院机
构改革方案的说明) [Explanation of the Plan for Restructuring the State Council] (Mar. 6, 
1998) ST. COUNCIL GAZ., 408. 
 30 Many sector management ministries were transformed into holding companies. See, 
e.g., Qian Jin, Lun Woguo Guoyou Konggu Gongsi de Zujian yu Fazhan (论我国国有控股
公司的组建与发展 ) [On the Formation and Development of State-owned Holding 
Company], 6 JINGJI YANJIU 31, 40 (1996) (discussing relevant research on the significance 
of this transformation). 
 31 See Ma Yingjuan, Jianguan Jigou yu Xingzheng Zuzhifa de Fazhan (监管机构与行
政组织法的发展) [Development of Regulatory Agency and Administrative Organizational 
Law], ZHEJIANG XUEKAN 16 (2007) (describing the regulatory agency development and its 
impact on administrative law). 
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Commission (“CSRC”), established in 1992 following the infamous 
Shenzhen “stock scramble” 32 ; the State Food and Drug 
Administration (“SFDA”) and State Insurance Regulatory 
Commission (“SIRC”) established in 1998; and the State Electricity 
Regulatory Commission (“SERC”) and China Banking Regulatory 
Commission (“CBRC”), both established in 2003.  The logic 
underlying the creation of all these functionally more limited 
regulatory agencies, though never openly stated, has been to 
disaggregate the policy-making function of the general ministries 
from the task of regulation, as well as to promote a concept of 
regulatory independence of regulation as understood in more 
developed countries.33 
In 2008, regulatory reform advanced a step further with the 
introduction of the so-called “super ministry” model. 34   This 
terminology refers to combining several agencies with similar 
functions into new single ministries like the Ministry of Industry & 
Information Technology (“MIIT”) and the Ministry of Human 
Resources & Social Security (“MHRSS”), to which extensive 
jurisdiction and policy-making powers are granted.35  The super 
ministry model is expected to reduce duplication of functions and 
                                                                                                           
 32 See Liu Hongru & Nan Yan, Zhengjianhui Dansheng de Taiqian Muhou (证监会诞
生的台前幕后) [Front Stage and Behind the Scenes of the Birth of the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission], ZHONGGUO JINGJI ZHOUKAN 64 (2009) (noting that Liu Hongru, 
first Chairman of the CSRC, recalled the establishment of the agency, including how the 
agency learned regulatory lessons from Taiwan, Hong Kong and other developed regions). 
 33 Zhou Hanhua, Duli Jianguan yu Dabuzhi de Guanxi (独立监管与大部制的关系) 
[The Relationship between Independent Regulation and Super Ministry], 5 GONGFA YANJIU 
5 (2007). 
 34 For example, the MIIT integrated the National Development and Reform 
Commission’s functions on industry and trade management, all the functions of the 
Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense except those on 
nuclear power management, and the functions of the Ministry of Information Industry and 
the State Council Information Office. The MHRSS integrated the functions of the Ministry 
of Personnel and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. Dishiyijie Quanguo Renmin 
Daibiao Dahui Diyici Huiyi Guanyu Guowuyuan Jigou Gaige Fang’An de Jueding (第十
一届全国人民代表大会第一次会议关于国务院机构改革方案的决定) [Decision of the 
First Session of the Eleventh National People’s Congress on the Plan for Restructuring the 
State Council] (promulgated by the First Session of the Eleventh Nat’l People’s Cong., 
Mar. 15, 2008), 3 STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ., 400–01. 
 35 Song Shiming, Lun Dabumen Tizhi de Jiben Goucheng Yaosu (论大部门体制的基
本构成要素) [On the Basic Elements of the Super Ministry System], 10 ZHONGGUO 
XINGZHENG GUANLI 34 (2009). 
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overlapping management among central departments. 36   By 
reducing inefficiency and bureaucracy, bigger ministries should 
result in smaller government, with fewer opportunities for 
corruption and dereliction of duty.  Altogether, through these 
various rounds of restructuring, the number of cabinet-level 
ministries was reduced from forty-five in 1982 down to twenty-
seven in 2008.37 
In March 2013, with the aim of further reducing the 
government’s role and promoting non-governmental and market 
forces, the Chinese government conducted another round of 
restructuring, dismantling and merging several important Cabinet-
level ministries, and further reducing the total number from twenty-
seven to twenty-five. 38   The vast and influential Ministry of 
Railways was broken up, and the National Population and Family 
Planning Commission—the powerful family planning authority—
was merged with the Ministry of Health.39  To boost food and drug 
safety, this restructuring plan established a ministerial-level China 
Food and Drug Administration (“CFDA”), taking over the 
respective duties of the State Council’s Food Safety Office, the 
State Food and Drug Administration, and the food supervision 
branches of the General Administration of Quality Supervision, 
Inspection, and Quarantine and the State Administration for 
                                                                                                           
 36 Dishiyijie Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Diyici Huiyi Guanyu Guowuyuan 
Jigou Gaige Fang’An de Jueding (第十一届全国人民代表大会第一次会议关于国务院
机构改革方案的决定) [Decision of the First Session of the Eleventh National People’s 
Congress on the Plan for Restructuring the State Council] (promulgated by the First 
Session of the Eleventh Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 15, 2008), 3 STANDING COMM. NAT’L 
PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ., 400–01. 
 37 See Zhao Fei, Sanshinian Lai Wuci Zhengfu Jigou Gaige Dapandian (三十年来五
次政府机构改革大盘点) [Overview of the Five Rounds of Government Institutional 
Reform in the Past Thirty Years], 3 ZHONGGUO BAODAO 67–68 (2008) (overviewing the 
five rounds of reform: (1) restructure of age structure of cadres, (2) shift in the functions of 
the government, (3) improvement of the adaptability to market economy, (4) more 
extensive and in-depth reform, and (5) further shift in governmental functions to embrace 
the WTO). 
 38 Dishierjie Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Diyici Huiyi Guanyu Guowuyuan 
Jigou Gaige he Zhineng Zhuanbian Fang’An de Jueding (第十二届全国人民代表大会第
一次会议关于国务院机构改革和职能转变方案的决定) [Decision of the First Session of 
the Eleventh National People’s Congress on the Plan on the Institutional Restructuring and 
Functional Transformation of the State Council] (promulgated by the Twelfth Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Mar. 14, 2013), 2 STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ.,  338–42. 
 39 Id. 
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Industry and Commerce.40  Lastly, the State Electricity Regulatory 
Commission, the first independent regulator of China’s 
infrastructure industries, was dissolved and its responsibilities taken 
over by a reorganized National Energy Administration, under the 
main state planning authority, the National Development and 
Reform Commission (“NDRC”).41 
Second, on the redefinition of the government’s precise role, 
the transformation has been from an “all-in-one” control of all 
facets of social and economic life to a more limited focus on four 
core aspects, as outlined by Working Guidelines of the State 
Council: (i) economic adjustment, (ii) market regulation, (iii) social 
administration, and (iv) public service. 42   This shift has been 
reinforced by laws, such as the 2003 Law on Administrative 
Licensing, which carve out a larger role for the market, civil society, 
and individuals, and place new restrictions on governmental 
intervention. 43   For example, Article 13 of the Law on 
Administrative Licensing specifies that administrative licenses may 
not be necessary if the relevant matters may be regulated by market 
competition mechanisms or other more private means, or at least 
later addressed by post hoc administrative supervision.44 
Third, regarding the tools for regulation, with “command 
and control” tools such as licensing, sanctions, inspections, and 
enforcement well established in various administrative laws, 45 
                                                                                                           
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Guowuyuan Gongzuo Guize (国务院工作规则) [The Working Rule of the State 
Council] (promulgated by the State Council, Mar. 23, 2013). 
 43 See Xingzheng Xuke Fa (行政许可法) [Administrative License Law] (promulgated 
by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 27, 2003, effective July 1, 2004) 
STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ., 5 (placing more restrictions on the 
government and allowing for more power to the people or private entities). See, e.g., Zhou 
Hanhua, Xingzheng Xuke Fa: Guannian Chuangxin yu Shijian Tiaozhan (行政许可法: 观
念创新与实践挑战) [Administrative License: Law-Concept Innovations and Practical 
Challenges], 2 FAXUE YANJIU 3–24 (2005) (discussing fundamental principles of the 
Administrative Approval Law). 
 44 Xingzheng Xuke Fa (行政许可法) [Administrative License Law] (promulgated by 
the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 27, 2003, effective July 1, 2004), art. 13, 
STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ., 5. 
 45 See, e.g., Xingzheng Qiangzhi Fa (行政强制法) [Administrative Compulsion Law] 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., June 30, 2011, effective Jan. 1, 
2012) STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ., 5 (showing the tools available in the 
Administrative Compulsion Law); Administrative License Law, supra note 43 (showing 
the tools available in the Administrative License Law); Xingzheng Chufa Fa (行政处罚法) 
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Chinese authorities are now trying to promote innovation in social 
administration by introducing more incentive-based regulatory tools, 
such as tradable allowances, franchise bidding, adverse publicity, 
and cooperative regulation. 46   Many non-formal modes of 
administration have also been created or used in practice, and they 
supplement and enrich legal methods that focus on approval and 
sanction.47  
The above analysis shows the ways in which regulatory 
reform has been accomplished in China in the past thirty-five to 
forty years.  One important characteristic to note is that this has 
been an incremental reform.  This incrementalism can be 
distinguished from the “shock therapy” approach pursued in the 
former Soviet Union and Eastern European countries.48  So far, 
                                                                                                           
[Law on Administrative Penalty] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s 
Cong., Mar. 17, 1996, effective Oct. 1, 1996) STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. 
GAZ., 3 (showing the tools available in the Administrative Penalty Law). 
 46 See, e.g., Yaopin Anquan “Heimingdan” Guanli Guiding (Shixing) (药品安全”黑
名单”管理规定(试行)) [Administrative Measures on Drug Safety “Blacklist” (For Trial 
Implementation)] (promulgated by the St. Food & Drug Admin., Aug. 13, 2012), 
http://www.sda.gov.cn/WS01/CL0844/74236.html [perma.cc/VPJ3-H5P5] (discussing 
negative incentives in the CFDA arena); Wenshi Qiti Ziyuan Jianpai Jiaoyi Guanli Banfa 
(温室气体自愿减排交易管理办法) [Interim Regulations on Voluntary Greenhouse Gas 
Emission Trading] (promulgated by the National Dev. and Reform Comm’n, June 23, 
2012), http://qhs.ndrc.gov.cn/zcfg/201206/t20120621_487133.html [perma.cc/8QAJ-
B8M3] (discussing positive and negative incentives in the emissions and environmental 
spaces); Shizheng Gongyong Shiye Texu Jingying Guanli Banfa (市政公用事业特许经营
管理办法) [Measures for the Administration on the Franchise of Municipal Public Utilities] 
(promulgated by the Ministry of Hous. and Urban-Rural Dev., Mar. 19, 2004), 
http://www.mohurd.gov.cn/fgjs/jsbgz/200611/t20061101_159064.html [perma.cc/JFN4-
W3MQ] (discussing incentives regarding public utilities and other social services). 
 47 See generally WAN JUN, SHEHUI JIANSHE YU SHEHUI GUANLI CHUANGXIN (社会建
设与社会管理创新) [SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION AND SOCIAL MANAGEMENT INNOVATION] 
(2011) (describing some informal methods of achieving innovation in administrative law); 
Cui Zhuolan & Liu Fuyuan, Shehui Guanli Chuangxin Guocheng Zhong de Xingzheng 
Jiguan Jiqi Xingwei (社会管理创新过程中的行政机关及其行为) [Administrative 
Agencies and Their Activity in the Process of Social Management Innovation], 3 SHEHUI 
KEXUE JIKAN 75, 75–80 (2012) (describing the informal and formal methods of 
administrative agencies that promote innovation in social management). 
 48 See generally JEFFERY SACHS, UNDERSTANDING SHOCK THERAPY (1994) (showing 
that shock therapy often involves radical reform programs carried out over a relatively 
short period of time). Jeffrey Sachs, former professor of economics at Harvard University 
and director of the Earth Institute at Columbia University, who helped develop shock 
therapy reform programs in Latin America and Eastern Europe, characterizes shock 
therapy as “a rapid, comprehensive, and far-reaching program of reforms to implement 
‘normal’ capitalism.” Jeffrey Sachs, Address at the Tanner Lectures on Human Values at 
the University of Utah: Shock Therapy in Poland: Perspectives of Five Years (April 6–7, 
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incremental regulatory reform in China can be deemed successful 
according to various indicators of economic development and living 
standards.  For example, from 1978 to 2012, the per capita annual 
income of urban residents increased from 343 yuan to 24,565 yuan; 
that of rural residents increased from 134 yuan to 7917 yuan.49  
From 1978 to 2007, the population living below the poverty line in 
rural area was reduced from 250 million (1978 poverty line was 
annual per capita income of  100 yuan) to 14.79 million (2007 
poverty line was annual per capita income of 785 yuan).50  And 
there are other measurements to consider.  After six rounds of 
reform from 2001 to 2012, the central government has cut 
administrative approval items by 69.3%.51  Currently, over 90% of 
the prices of commodities and services are determined by the 
market rather than the government. 52   In 2012, private sector 
contributions accounted for more than 60% of GDP.53 
                                                                                                           
1994) (stating that, in economics, shock therapy refers to the sudden release of price and 
currency controls, withdrawal of state subsidies, and immediate trade liberalization within 
a country; it usually also includes large-scale privatization of previously publicly owned 
assets). 
 49 Feng Yilin, Fanying Jumin Shouru Shiji Zengzhang Yao Kouchu Jiage Shangzhang 
Yingxiang (反映居民收入实际增长要扣除价格上涨影响) [Reflecting Real Residential 
Income Growth after Offsetting Price Increases], NATIONAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS OF THE 
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/sjjd/201311/t20131114_461380.html [perma.cc/G9FG-DFBT]. 
 50 Guojia Fazhan Gaige Wei Jingji Tizhi Zonghe Gaige Si & Guojia Fazhan Gaige 
Wei Jingji Tizhi Yu Guanli Yanjiusuo(国家发展改革委经济体制综合改革司、国家发
展改革委经济体制与管理研究所)[Comprehensive Reform of Economy System Division 
of the NDRC & Institute of Economy System and Management of the NDRC],  GAIGE 
KAIFANG SANSHINIAN: CONG LISHI ZOUXIANG WEILAI——ZHONGGUO 
JINGJI TIZHI GAIGE RUOGAN LISHI JINGYAN YANJIU(改革开放三十年：从历史
走向未来——中国经济体制改革若干历史经验研究)[ REFORM AND OPENNING 
UP IN THIRTY YEARS: FROM HISOTRY TOWARD THE FUTURE——RESEARCH 
ON SEVERAL HISTORICAL EXPERIENCES OF CHINA’S ECONOMY REFORM], 
70(2008). 
 51 Wen Jiabao, Zhengfu Gongzuo Baogao (政府工作报告) [Report on the Work of 
the Government] (delivered at the First Session of the Twelfth Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 
5, 2013) RENMIN RIBAO. 
 52 Guojia Jiwei, Jianshao Jiage Shenpi XiangMu, Fangkai Shangpin Fuwu Jiage (减
少价格审批项目，放开商品服务价格 ) [To Reduce Price Review and Approval, 
Deregulate Prices of Goods and Services] (promulgated by the State Council Info. Office, 
July 11, 2001), XINWEN FABUHUI JI, 351. 
 53 Pan Yue, Minying Jingji Zhan GDP Bizhong Chao 60% (民营经济占 GDP 比重超
60%) [Share of Private Sector in GDP Over 60%], RENMIN RIBAO, 1, (2013). 
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III. CHALLENGES TO FURTHER REFORM 
Finally, I will elaborate upon the challenges and problems 
faced by the Chinese government in pursuing further regulatory 
reform.  In my view, there are four fundamental challenges that will 
prove very difficult to overcome.  First, the incremental approach to 
reform tends to focus more on immediate problems, and less on 
developing overall strategy.54   As a result, it leaves the most 
difficult tasks to the future, and prevents certain core reforms from 
ever being initiated.  For example, though separation between 
government and enterprise has been a main theme of Chinese 
reform for more than thirty years, local governments still have 
remained enmeshed in economic activities for the sake of local 
revenue, investment, and GDP.  This involvement has created 
misallocations between government and enterprise,55  as well as 
distortion of law enforcement, such as selective enforcement56 and 
entrapment practices.57  
In addition, despite the fact that the central government has 
cut bureaucratic red tape by 69.3%, the items that have been cut 
mostly are not that significant, and cutting them has not changed the 
fact that the government rather than the market has remained the 
dominant player in resource allocation.  Even today, private capital 
                                                                                                           
 54 See generally CHINA’S ECONOMIC REFORMS: THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF 
INCREMENTALISM (STUDIES ON THE CHINESE ECONOMY) (Qimiao Fan & Peter Nolan eds., 
1994) (explaining an analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of “incrementalism”); 
Alwyn Young, The Razor’s Edge: Distortions and Incremental Reform in the People’s 
Republic of China, 115 Q. J. ECON. 1091, 1092–94 (2000) (examining incremental reforms 
in China and the new distortions they created in the economy). 
 55 See, e.g., Zhao Shukai, Nongcun Fazhan yu Jiceng Zhengfu Gongsihua (农村发展
与基层政府公司化) [Rural Development and Local Governments as Corporations], 10 
ZHONGGUO FA ZHAN GUANCHA 48 (2006) (describing the development of local 
governments in rural areas as if they were corporations); Andrew G. Walder, Local 
Governments as Industrial Firms: An Organizational Analysis of China’s Transitional 
Economy, 101 AM. J. SOC. 263, 268–69 (1995) (presenting an analysis of industrial 
organization as one where the relationship between governments and enterprises is 
analogous to the relations within a corporation). 
 56 Dai Zhiyong, Xuanzexing Zhifa (选择性执法) [Selective Enforcement], 4 FA XUE 
YAN JIU 28 (2008). 
 57 Sang Benqian, “Diaoyu Zhifa” yu “Hou Diaoyu Zhifa” de Shidai Kunjing: 
Wangluo Quntixing Shijian de Ge’an Yanjiu (“钓鱼执法”与”后钓鱼时代”的执法困境：
网络群体性事件的个案研究 ) [Dilemma of Law Enforcement in the Post-“Entrapment” 
Era: A Case Study of Cyberspace Mass Disturbance], 2011 ZHONG WAI FA XUE 204. 
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still cannot invest in certain key areas like energy and 
telecommunications.58 
Moreover, when it comes to government restructuring, many 
agencies are placed in charge of designing the blueprint for reform 
and then implementing this plan themselves—combining the roles 
of “player and referee.”59  The “super ministry” reforms of 2008 and 
2013 have not changed this trend; in fact, the super ministry model 
has only reinforced the problem, making core reform, such as 
functional transformation, even more challenging.  Indeed, how to 
compel these bigger ministries to deregulate and decentralize may 
prove to be an even more arduous task in the years to come.  To use 
the terminology of Professor Wu Jinglian, China needs to overcome 
“big obstacles,” 60  and all these big obstacles are difficult to 
overcome.  Although the incremental approach has enjoyed some 
success thus far, it has not always proved sufficient to overcome 
such big or critical obstacles, and so there is reason to doubt it 
would ultimately be successful. 
The second challenge is that the driving impetus for reform 
has been diminishing in China.  There have been two major driving 
forces for Chinese regulatory reform over the past thirty-five years, 
which have been most effective.  The first has been outside pressure.  
External competition has always been the most powerful driving 
force for reform in China.  For example, if someone tells our leaders, 
“well, India has been doing this and that,” these leaders cannot 
wait—they have to do it too.   
                                                                                                           
 58 For an excellent case study, see ROSELYN HSUEH, CHINA’S REGULATORY STATE: A 
NEW STRATEGY FOR GLOBALIZATION, 193–270 (2011) (explaining why private capital 
investments in certain key areas are problematic). 
 59 See generally Liu Hong, Tigaiwei: Gaige de Zhongshu (体改委: 改革的中枢) 
[State Economic Structure Reform Commission: Center of Reform], JINGJI GUANCHA BAO, 
45 (2010) (noting the roles of the State Economic Structure Reform Commission in three 
momentous events in reform, i.e., the establishment of market economy, change in the 
tradition of planned economy, and clarification of the relationships among the government, 
market and enterprises); Liu Jipeng, Cong Xiangnian Tigaiwei Shuoqi (从想念体改委说起) 
[Beginning with Recalling State Economic Structure Reform Commission], NANFANG 
ZHOUMO (2004) (discussing the decision-making process of the State Economic Structure 
Reform Commission). 
 60 See generally WU JINGLIAN, GAIGE: WOMEN ZHENGZAI GUODAGUAN (改革: 我们正
在过大关） [REFORM: WE ARE NOW AT A CRITICAL POINT] 102–103 (2001) (arguing that 
four key problems need to be solved during the process of economic reform: adjusting 
ownership structure, addressing discriminatory treatment against private enterprises, 
building market-supportive institutions, and establishing the rule of law). 
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Despite the influence of competition, because of the 
consequences of economic growth, Chinese government officials 
now enjoy many financial resources, and generally appear satisfied 
with the status quo.  Some even say, “now socialism can not only 
save China, it can save the world.”61  So where is the pressure for 
reform?  Recently my colleagues and I were entrusted to draft a new 
regulation for promoting economic reform.  As a result, we 
conducted very intensive field investigations.  I visited Shenzhen 
and talked to some officials there.  The impression I got was that no 
one cared too much about reform.  Everyone has a nice house, a 
good salary, and a fancy car.  With those factors in place, there is 
little incentive for change. 
The second major driving force for reform in the past thirty-
five to forty years has been governmental incentives, from the “top 
down” and “bottom up” (i.e. from both the central and local 
governments).  This form of motivation has been very effective.  
But now, many officials do not have the proper incentives for 
further reform.  Local governments can just raise the price of 
housing, collect on this increase, sell land usage rights, and then 
allocate the money for their own purposes—rendering incentives for 
reform ineffective.  The electricity sector provides another good 
illustration: until 2002, independent generators contributed nearly 
half of nationwide electricity production while the State Electricity 
Group produced the other half. 62   However, since the State 
Electricity Group monopolized the state grid, it tended to hinder 
competition in the wholesale market, by not purchasing enough 
electricity from the independent generators.63  In order to promote 
fair competition, the central government launched a series of 
reforms in 2002,64  dismantling the State Electricity Group into two 
grid operators and five major electricity generation companies, and 
                                                                                                           
 61 See, e.g., CHEN SIJIN, ZHIYOU SHEHUI ZHUYI CAINENG JIU MEIGUO (只有社会主义
才能救美国） [ONLY SOCIALISM CAN SAVE THE UNITED STATES] 211–212 (2010) (arguing 
that the Obama Administration is using socialist policies to rescue the US economy). 
62 Liu Shujie, Ruhe Bimian Fan Luoji (如何避免反逻辑) [How to Prevent Electric 
Restructuring from Being Illogical], 12 NENGYUAN PINGLUN (2016). 
63 Wang Xiaobing, Dianli Gaige Fang’an Shimo (电力改革方案始末) [The Whole 
Story of the Electricity Reform Plan], 4 ZHONGGUO GAIGE, 58 (2004). 
 64 The State Council approved Dianli Tizhi Gaige Fang’an (电力体制改革方案) 
[Reform Plan of the Electricity Sector] in 2002, and launched a series of reforms. 
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passing regulations aimed at promoting competition.  The State 
Electricity Regulatory Commission was established in 2003, based 
on electricity sector reform in other countries.65  Despite these 
changes, after ten years, a competitive market has not emerged, and 
no other substantial reforms have been adopted.  The power to 
regulate tariffs and market entry in the electricity sector has 
continued to belong to the National Development and Reform 
Commission.  As long as the NDRC can raise the price of the 
electricity, which has been the case in past years, major stakeholders 
including generators and grid operators continue to make money, 
and hence accept the status quo without pushing for further reform.  
Under these circumstances, the SERC has neither jurisdiction nor 
incentive to regulate at all, and so has been nicknamed the “research 
institute of electricity.”66 
A third challenge has to do with the difficulty of transition.    
Rule of law, a market economy, freedom—all of these elements are 
part of that goal.  But in such a big and complicated country, the 
most difficult question is, how do we reach that goal?  There are all 
kinds of challenges—including social unrest—that are occurring 
during this transitional period.  Against this backdrop, one can 
observe a recurring swing from the newer regulatory model back to 
the traditional management approach, which is still effective for 
dealing with some problems. 
For example, during the Olympics, the Chinese government 
applied its traditional approach to security and was very successful; 
it prevented all major accidents and potential bombings.67  However, 
this approach based on political mobilization could not be later 
                                                                                                           
 65 Zhang Guobao, Dian Gai Shinian de Huigu yu Sibian 2 (电改十年的回顾与思辨 2) 
[Review and Thoughts on the Ten Years of Electricity Sector Reform, Part II], ZHONGGUO 
JINGJI ZHOUKAN, 43 (2013). 
 66 Mr. Shao Bingren, former vice chairman of the SERC, openly criticized the 
stagnation or even regression of electricity reform during 2012 National People’s Congress 
and CPPCC sessions. Tong Xiaobo, Cheng Zhen, Li Yongqiang & Hu Xuecui, Daibiao 
Weiyuan Reyi Nengyuan Tigai yu Jiagai ( 代 表 委员 热议 能 源 体改 与 价改 ) 
[Representatives of the National People’s Congress and Members of the National 
Committee of Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference Discuss Energy Reform 
and Price Reform], ZHONGGUO NENGYUAN BAO, 2 (2012). 
 67 Meng Jianzhu, Ba Aoyun Anbao Chenggong Jingyan Zhuanhua Wei Changxiao 
Jizhi (把奥运安保成功经验转化为畅销机制) [Turning the Successful Experience of the 
Beijing Olympics Security into a Permanent Mechanism], RENMIN RIBAO (HAIWAI BAN), 2 
(2008). 
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sustained because of its high cost.  Hence, the pendulum swung 
back to newer regulatory approaches, which are more cost-effective.  
These new approaches might continue to be applied during “normal” 
periods, but whenever there are accidents or crises, the government 
will revert back to its traditional approach.  In the public health 
arena, the Chinese government’s approach to the outbreak of SARS 
in 2003 provides another good illustration.68  So there is an ongoing 
challenge of not being able to rely on new regulatory approaches 
being used consistently, or predictably operated. 
The fourth challenge is the lack of rule of law and judicial 
independence in China.  In many respects, the legal framework calls 
for further improvement; in other respects, well-crafted laws are not 
observed or strictly enforced.69  This all contributes to a serious 
dilemma.  On the one hand, traditional rules, which mostly are not 
consistent with a market economy and not able to be amended in 
time due to legislative weakness, must be ignored or even broken in 
order to promote a new regulatory system.  Indeed, China’s reform 
process has been one in which traditional rules have been gradually 
tossed away.  In Guangdong Province, for example, it is common 
wisdom that one must move quickly when facing “a yellow light” 
(i.e., rules) and circumvent when facing a “red light” (i.e., 
                                                                                                           
 68 Due to China’s weak public health protection system, after the SARS outbreak, 
many local governments (including Beijing’s) relied on mass mobilization, almost martial 
in nature, to register, monitor and control the movement of their populations. The titles of 
newspaper reports from that time illustrate the ubiquitous use of these measures. See, e.g., 
Zhao Hong & Sun Haihua, Quanmin Da Hao Kangfei Gongjianzhan (全民打好: “抗非”攻
坚战) [Mobilizing the People of the Whole Country and Declaring the Hard War against 
SARS], XI’AN RIBAO (2003) (describing the SARS incident as a war and the people as the 
millitary); Li Jian, Zhunbei Changqi Zuozhan Yanba Beijing Damen (准备长期作战严把
北京大门) [Preparing Long-term Battle, Tightly Controlling the Gate of Beijing], BEIJING 
RIBAO (2003) (advocating the people in Beijing to take their responsibility to fight against 
SARS); Zhang Zhengjun & Li Changjiang, Qunfang Qunkong Kangji Feidian: Henan 
Sheng Junqu Dongyuan Minbing Touru Fang Feidian Zhandou (群防群控 抗击非典: 河
南省军区动员民兵投入防非典战斗) [Fighting SARS by Mass Prevention and Control: 
Henan Provincial Military Command Enters the Battle with People’s Militia], JIEFANGJUN 
BAO (2003) (mobilizing people’s militia to be responsible for SARS control). 
 69 GUOWUYUAN XINWEN BANGONGSHI, ZHONGGUO DE FAZHI JIANSHE (中国的法制建
设) [CHINA’S EFFORTS AND ACHIEVEMENTS IN PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW] (2008). See 
also Chen Hongyi, Zhongguo Zouxiang Fazhi zhi Lu de Huigu (中国走向法治之路的回顾) 
[Review of China’s Road Towards Rule of Law], 115 ERSHIYI SHIJI 9–11 (2009) (arguing 
that the tension between traditional Chinese conception of social governance and the 
modern conception of law in some sense prevents China to approach modern rule of law). 
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prohibitions) in order to pursue reform.70  However, regulatory 
reform that contradicts current rules too much will damage the 
people’s confidence in the law, and the rule of law more generally. 
Always, in practice, there is a tension between lawfulness 
(“law by the books”) and rationality (“law in action”).  At the 
extremes, this tension becomes a dilemma between legal nihilism 
and legal formalism.  Because China has not had a “rule of law” 
tradition, steps must be taken to establish the authority of law.  But, 
the other end of the spectrum of legal formalism may be in conflict 
with social requirements and pose obstacles to reform.  Just as the 
pendulum swings between the old and new regulatory approaches in 
China, so too when it swings to the extreme of legal formalism 
(which also happened in the United States in the 1930s),71 the 
pendulum then inevitably swings back to legal nihilism.  This is the 
reason for the call for innovation of social administration in recent 
years: certain government leaders have found out the legal system 
does not work at all and cannot solve difficult problems.72  Quite 
often law professors only criticize administrative actions, saying 
“you cannot do this, you cannot do that.”  But government officials 
reply, “well, tell me what I should do—I have to get the job done.” 
Regulatory research is extremely important for these 
purposes.  From the regulatory perspective, officials must not only 
be told what they cannot do, but also what they can do and the 
                                                                                                           
 70 Some Chinese scholars have referred to these phenomena as “positive violations of 
law” (liangxing weifa), and suggested they should not be refuted totally. See, e.g., He Li, 
Liangfa Zhi Zhi he Liangxing Weifa (良法之治和良性违法) [Rule of Good Law and 
Positive Violation of Law], 3 YUNNAN XINGZHENG XUEYUAN XUEBAO 73 (2003) 
(discussing positive violations of law and their effects). Other Chinese scholars insist that 
so-called “positive violations of law” should not be tolerated by a society based on rule of 
law. See, e.g., Li Kejie, Fazhi Shehui Buneng Rongren “Liangxing Weifa” (法治社会不能
容忍“良性违法”) [“Positive Violation of Law” Cannot Be Tolerated in a Rule of Law 
Society], 2 FAZHI YU SHEHUI 25 (2007) (dismissing positive violations of law as a valid 
principle to use). 
 71 See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936) (“When an Act of Congress 
is appropriately challenged in the courts as not conforming to the constitutional mandate, 
the judicial branch of government has only one duty—to lay the article of the Constitution 
which is involved beside the statute which is challenged and to decide whether the latter 
squares with the former”). 
 72 Zhonggong Zhongyang Guowuyuan Guanyu Jiaqiang Shehui Chuangxin Guanli de 
Yijian (中共中央国务院关于加强社会创新管理的意见) [Opinions of the CPC Central 
Committee and the State Council on Social Management Innovation] (promulgated by the 
CPC Cent. Comm. and the St. Council, July 2011), 
http://www.reformdata.org/content/20110919/24066.html [perma.cc/7HP7-SZZM]. 
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smartest way to get the job done.  This is a big challenge, not only 
for government, but also for legal scholars who are only familiar 
with pure legal rules. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
China’s regulatory reform is by and large analogous to 
regulatory reform generally, in other countries.  There is no such 
thing as a “China Model” as has been promoted in recent years by 
different parties.73  However, China does have its own problems and 
challenges due to its unique history and current regime.  There is a 
big question as to whether China’s incremental approach ultimately 
will be successful.  So far, it has been proven repeatedly that the 
incremental approach cannot overcome fundamental shortcomings, 
and obstacles to reform have only accumulated.  In order to 
transcend government-imposed limits, it is important to develop a 
comprehensive governance structure, and let the market, civil 
society, and the legal system each play a bigger role.  All of these 
mechanisms have been emerging in practice and it is worthwhile to 
observe how they have interacted with the government regulatory 
mechanism.  The interactions among different driving forces will 
determine the future of regulatory reform in China. 
Moreover, China’s regulatory reform has also shown that 
theory and ideology can play a very important role in institutional 
development.  Actually, the term “regulation” (“jianguan”) is a 
relatively new word in China.  Before 1995, jianguan was limited to 
the areas of prison management and customs; there was no broader 
understanding of this term at all.74  For example, the Eighth Five 
                                                                                                           
 73 See ZHONGGUO JINGJI ZHONGCHANGQI FAZHAN HE ZHUANXING—GUOJI SHIJIAO DE 
SIKAO HE JIANYI (中国经济中长期发展和转型: 国际视角的思考和建议) [MEDIUM AND 
LONG TERM DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSFORMATION OF CHINESE ECONOMY: THOUGHTS 
FROM AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE] 5 (Edwin Lim & Michael Spence eds., 2011) 
(noting that since World War II, there have been only thirteen economic entities with 
annual growth rates above 7% for more than twenty-five consecutive years. They have five 
common features, though each one has its own characteristics). See generally HUANG 
YASHENG, CAPITALISM WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS (2010) (discussing Professor 
Huang Yasheng of MIT’s Sloan School’s now famous analysis and critiques of the so-
called “China Model”); HUANG YASHENG, “ZHONGGUO MOSHI” DAODI YOU DUO DUTE? 
(“中国模式”到底有多独特？) [HOW UNIQUE IS THE CHINA MODEL?] (2011). 
 74 See, e.g., ZHONGGUO ZHENGFA DAXUE JIANYU SHIXUE YANJIU ZHONGXIN, JIANYU 
WENHUA JIANSHE YU JIANGUAN ANQUAN GONGZUO YANJIU (监狱文化建设与监管安全工
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Year Plan issued in 1991 did not use the term “regulation” at all.75  
The Ninth Five Year Plan issued in 1996 was the first official 
document to mention the term.76  Most recently, the Twelfth Five 
Year Plan issued in 2011 mentioned the term “regulation” forty-
seven times.77   
Indeed, the term has become so popular that even 
government agencies tend to go out of their way to link themselves 
to it.  Strictly speaking, the English names of such agencies like the 
CSRC, SIRC, and CBRC should be translated into “supervision and 
administration commissions”—in Chinese, the word “regulatory” 
does not actually appear (the only exception is SERC, whose 
Chinese name does connote a regulatory body).78  It seems that 
these agencies all chose technically improper English translations of 
their names in order to emphasize their role in regulation rather than 
their general supervisory or administrative roles.  From the 
translation of these agency names, as well as many practical steps 
the agencies have been taking, one can infer the influence of 
regulatory theory and the mindset of agency officials who want to 
catch up with the international trend of regulatory reform. 
China’s regulatory reform started much earlier than the 
adoption of regulatory theory.  But since the introduction of new 
concepts in the mid-1990s, China’s regulatory reform has had a new 
blueprint.79  Regulatory reform has obtained new momentum, and 
                                                                                                           
作研究 ) [STUDY ON CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN PRISONS AND SAFETY IN PRISON 
ADMINISTRATION] 1 (Ma Zhibing & Jiao Ningya et al. eds., 2011) (describing the use of the 
term jianguan in prisons). 
75 The Ten-Year Layout for National Economy and Social Development and Eighth 
Five-Year Plan (approved by the fourth session of the Seventh National People’s Congress 
(NPC) in March 1991). 
 76 Guomin Jingji he Shehui Fazhan Jiuwu Jihua he Erlingyiling Nian Yuanjing 
Mubiao Gangyao (国民经济和社会发展”九五”计划和二零一零年远景目标纲要) [The 
Ninth Five-Year Plan on National Economy and Social Development and Long-Range 
Objectives for the Year 2010] (promulgated by the Eight Nat’l People’s Cong. Fourth 
Session, Mar. 17, 1996) STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ., at 2 (introducing 
this concept officially). 
77 The Twelfth Five-Year Plan (approved by the National People's Congress on March 
14, 2011). 
78 The full name of SERC is “Guojia Dianli Jianguan Weiyuanhui” (国家电力监管委
员会), and “jianguan” (监管) is the Chinese translation of regulation. 
 79 Liu Peng, Zhongguo Jianguanxing Zhengfu Jianshe: Yige Fenxi Kuangjia (中国监
管型政府建设：一个分析框架) [Regulatory State Building in China: An Analytical 
Framework], 2 GONGGONG XINGZHENG PINGLUN 53 (2011). 
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institutional arrangements have been established on a much more 
solid foundation.  Based on the above analysis, it is apparent that 
serious theoretical discussion and effective international cooperation 
will be necessary for further reform and progress in China. 
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